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The area of belief revision studies how a rational agent may incorporate new information
about a domain into its belief corpus. An agent is characterised by a belief state K , and
receives a new item of information α which is to be included among its set of beliefs.
Revision then is a function from a belief state and a formula to a new belief state.
We propose here a more general framework for belief revision, in which revision is a
function from a belief state and a ﬁnite set of formulas to a new belief state. In particular,
we distinguish revision by the set {α,β} from the set {α ∧ β}. This seemingly innocuous
change has signiﬁcant ramiﬁcations with respect to iterated belief revision. A problem in
approaches to iterated belief revision is that, after ﬁrst revising by a formula and then by a
formula that is inconsistent with the ﬁrst formula, all information in the original formula
is lost.
This problem is avoided here in that, in revising by a set of formulas S , the resulting belief
state contains not just the information that members of S are believed to be true, but
also the counterfactual supposition that if some members of S were later believed to be
false, then the remaining members would nonetheless still be believed to be true. Thus
if some members of S were in fact later believed to be false, then the other elements
of S would still be believed to be true. Hence, we provide a more nuanced approach to
belief revision. The general approach, which we call parallel belief revision, is independent
of extant approaches to iterated revision. We present ﬁrst a basic approach to parallel
belief revision. Following this we combine the basic approach with an approach due to Jin
and Thielscher for iterated revision. Postulates and semantic conditions characterising these
approaches are given, and representation results provided. We conclude with a discussion
of the possible ramiﬁcations of this approach in belief revision in general.
© 2011 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
An agent situated in a suﬃciently complex domain will have only incomplete and possibly inaccurate information about
that domain. Consequently, such an agent would be expected to receive new information about the domain which it would
incorporate into its belief corpus. Since new information may conﬂict with the agent’s accepted beliefs, the agent may also
have to discard some of its beliefs before the new information can be consistently incorporated. Belief revision is the area
of knowledge representation that addresses how an agent may incorporate new information about a domain into its belief
corpus. It is generally accepted that there is no single best revision operator, and different agents may have different revision
functions. However, revision functions are not arbitrary, but may be considered as being guided or characterised by various
rationality criteria, expressed formally as a set of postulates. The original and best-known set of postulates is called the AGM
postulates [1,16] named after the developers of this framework. As well, several formal constructions of revision functions
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the world. Ideally, a set of postulates is linked with a formal construction by a representation result, showing that a revision
function that satisﬁes a postulate set can be represented by the formal construction, and vice versa.
The foundations of AGM revision are well studied and well understood.1 Subsequently, there has been a great deal of
attention paid to iterated belief revision, which addresses logical relations among a sequence of revisions involving possibly-
conﬂicting observations. While there has been much progress in the area of iterated belief revision, virtually all such work
suffers from the following problem: if one revises by a formula and then by a formula that is inconsistent with this formula,
then the agent’s beliefs are exactly the same as if only the second revision had taken place.
For example, consider the situation where there was a party, but where you have no knowledge about whether Alice (a)
or Bob (b) were there. You are subsequently informed by a reliable source that both Alice and Bob went to the party. This
would correspond to a revision by a ∧ b, and your resulting belief state would be one in which you believe a ∧ b to be
true. You later learn that Alice in fact did not go to the party. Not only do you now accept ¬a, but in all major approaches
to iterated belief revision, including [9,6,32,21], you no longer accept b either. While there may indeed be cases where it’s
reasonable to no longer believe Bob was at the party (for example perhaps Bob is Alice’s spouse), this certainly shouldn’t
be a required outcome.
This example can be exaggerated to emphasise the point: Consider where an agent initially has no contingent beliefs,
and so its beliefs are characterised by the set of tautologies. Next, a substantial body of knowledge, given by the conjunction
p1 ∧ · · · ∧ p1012 , is loaded into the agent’s knowledge base. If we subsequently revise by, say, the negation of p1, then all
other knowledge is lost. That is, if the agent’s original (tautological) beliefs were given by K and ∗ is the revision function,
we would obtain:(
K ∗ (p1 ∧ · · · ∧ p1012)
) ∗ ¬p1 ≡ K ∗ ¬p1. (1)
Thus all other information is lost, except for the newly-negated item. Again, this is clearly too strong a condition to impose
on every revision function in all circumstances.
We suggest that this problem is appropriately addressed not by modifying the foundations of belief revision, but rather
by providing a more nuanced or expressive approach to revision. Speciﬁcally, we propose that the second argument of a
revision function be generalised to be a set of formulas. This then distinguishes revision by a set of formulas from revision
by the conjunction of that set of formulas. Consider again our Alice/Bob example, where again at the outset you have no
beliefs about whether either of them attended a party or not, but you are subsequently informed that they both went to
the party. Consequently, if you were now asked “Do you believe that Alice went to the party?”, clearly you would answer in
the aﬃrmative. Assume further that you have no reason to believe that Alice and Bob know each other well, nor have been
in contact; i.e. each individual’s attendance is independent of the other’s. If you were asked “If it were in fact the case that
Alice did not go, would you still believe that Bob went?”, then again you would answer in the aﬃrmative. However, it can
be noted that this last question is a counterfactual query, in that as far as you know the antecedent is false. We are not going
to be concerned with counterfactuals per se in this paper; however, this does have implications for further revisions: If you
were subsequently informed that in fact Alice did not go, then you should in turn continue to believe that Bob went. If, on
the other hand, you had some reason to believe that Alice and Bob’s attendance were linked – for example that they’re a
couple – then this would no longer apply.
The key point here is that we are treating the propositions A and B as separate items of information. Our central thesis
is that revision by a conjunction and revision by the set of conjuncts should be treated differently. If a formula is taken
as representing some item of information, then informally a conjunction represents a single item of information, while the
corresponding set of conjuncts represents a collection of items of information. To be sure, the conjunction α ∧ β and the
set {α,β} have the same logical content, in that they entail exactly the same formulas. Hence an agent’s contingent beliefs
should be the same regardless of whether a revision is by a conjunction or a corresponding set of formulas. However,
as argued above, in revising by a set {α,β} the agent’s resulting belief state should be such that, if there is no known
connection between α and β , then if β were subsequently learned to be false, then α should still be believed to be true.
To this end, we develop an account of belief revision that we call parallel belief revision in which the second argument to
a revision function is a ﬁnite set of formulas. Thus, if the agent’s belief state is given by K2 and ∗ is a revision function, then
we distinguish K ∗ {α ∧ β} from K ∗ {α,β}. In the former, revision is by a single formula that happens to be expressed as a
conjunction. If a subsequent revision contradicts this formula, then this formula is simply no longer believed. On the other
hand, if the agent views α and β as independent, then it makes sense that α is believed in K ∗ {α,β} ∗ {¬β}, since if one
element of the input set is contradicted, this need not affect belief in other element. Essentially, for a revision K∗{α,β}, the
agent comes to believe not only that α and β are contingently true, but also counterfactual assertions such as if β were false
then α would (where “reasonable”) still be believed to be true. In terminology introduced in the next section, the agent’s
belief state or epistemic state is modiﬁed so that such counterfactuals are implicitly believed. Hence, continuing the above
1 See [35] for a recent, comprehensive survey of revision in general.
2 The distinction between the K of (1) and K is described more fully in the next section. Basically K is the agent’s contingent beliefs concerning the
domain; K is the agent’s full epistemic state, containing not just K but also, for example, information about how the agent’s beliefs would change if it
were to learn a new piece of information.
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to believe that α was true. That is, all other things being equal, we would have that α is believed in K ∗ {α,β} ∗ {¬β}.
In this paper, we develop approaches to parallel belief revision and show how the aforementioned problems are resolved.
Notably, in our approach we obtain that under reasonable assumptions (for example, that α and β are not logically equiv-
alent) that α is believed in K ∗ {α,β} ∗ {¬β}. As well, it proves to be the case that parallel belief revision is independent
of other accounts of iterated belief revision, in that it can be combined with extant approaches to belief revision. This then
supports the assertion that our approach provides a more ﬁne-grained account of revision, rather than providing an alter-
native to existing accounts. Consequently, we ﬁrst describe the most basic approach to parallel revision, and then show how
this approach can be combined with the approach to iterated revision of Jin and Thielscher [21].
The next section reviews the area of belief revision and further motivates our approach. Following this, we give an
account of the most basic approach to parallel revision. We then combine this approach with that of Jin and Thielscher [21].
In each case, postulates characterising the revision function are given, a semantic account is provided, and a representation
result is provided linking the postulates and semantic construction. We conclude with a discussion of wider implications
of the approach to belief revision as a whole, and iterated revision in particular. Proofs of all formal results are given in
Appendix A. An earlier version of this paper appeared in [10].
2. Background
2.1. Formal preliminaries
We assume a propositional language L generated from a ﬁnite set P of atomic propositions. The language is that
of classical propositional logic, and with the classical consequence relation . Formulas are denoted by lower-case Greek
letters α,β, . . . , while sets of formulas are denoted by upper case Roman letters, A, B, S, . . . . The symbol  stands for some
arbitrary tautology and ⊥ stands for ¬. Cn(A) is the set of logical consequences of A, that is Cn(A) = {α ∈ L | A  α}. For a
(ﬁnite) set of formulas S , ∧S is the conjunction of members of S , ∨S is the corresponding disjunction, and S = {¬α | α ∈ S}.
Given two sets of formulas A and B , A + B denotes the expansion of A by B , that is A + B = Cn(A ∪ B). Expansion of a set
A by a formula β is deﬁned analogously. Two sentences α and β are logically equivalent, written α ≡ β , iff α  β and β  α.
This extends to sets of sentences by: S1 ≡ S2 iff S1  α for every α ∈ S2 and S2  β for every β ∈ S1. Thus in particular for
any ﬁnite set of formulas S , we have S ≡ ∧S .
A propositional interpretation (also referred to as a possible world) is a mapping from P to {true, false}. The set of all
interpretations is denoted by ΘP . A model of a sentence α is an interpretation w that makes α true according to the usual
deﬁnition of truth, and is denoted by w | α. For W ⊆ ΘP , we also write W | α if w | α for every w ∈ W . For a set
of sentences A, Mod(A) is the set of all models of A. For simplicity, Mod({α}) is also written as Mod(α). Conversely, given
a set of possible worlds W ⊆ ΘP , we denote by T (W) the set of sentences which are true in all elements of W , that is
T (W) = {α ∈ L | w | α for all w ∈ W}.
A total preorder  is a reﬂexive, transitive binary relation, such that either w1  w2 or w2  w1 for every w1,w2. The
strict part of  is denoted by ≺, that is, w1  w2 and w2  w1. We use w1 = w2 to abbreviate w1  w2 and w2  w1.3
Given a set S and total preorder  deﬁned on members of S , we denote by min(S,) the set of minimal elements of S in .
2.2. Belief revision
In the original AGM theory, beliefs of an agent are represented by a belief set, that is, a set of formulas K such that
K = Cn(K ). Belief revision is modelled as a function from a belief set K and a formula α to a belief set K ′ such that α is
believed in K ′ , i.e. α ∈ K ′ . Since α may be inconsistent with K , and since it is desirable to maintain consistency if at all
possible (i.e. if not  ¬α), then some formulas may need to dropped from K before α can be consistently added.
The AGM approach also addressed two other operators. The expansion of a belief set K by a formula α has already
been deﬁned in the previous subsection. In contrast to revision and expansion, where an agent gains information, in belief
contraction the reasoner loses information. The contraction of a belief set K by a formula α, denoted K −˙α, is a belief set
where K −˙α ⊆ K and α /∈ K −˙α. So in a contraction by α, the agent loses its belief in α while not necessarily believing ¬α.
Since our focus in this paper is on revision, we do not consider contraction further, except brieﬂy in Section 2.4, where we
review set-based approaches to contraction that have been proposed in the literature.
An important assumption concerning belief revision is that it takes place in an inertial (or static) world, so that the
input is with respect to the same, static world. However, various researchers have argued that, in order to address iterated
belief revision, it is more appropriate to consider belief states (also called epistemic states) as objects of revision. A belief
state K effectively encodes information regarding how the revision function itself changes under a revision.4 The belief set
corresponding to belief state K is denoted Bel(K). Formally, a revision operator ∗ maps a belief state K and formula α to a
revised belief state K ∗ α. Then, in the spirit of [9], the AGM postulates for revision can be reformulated as follows:
3 Relations in a total preorder will be subscripted with an epistemic state, described in the next subsection. In particular, for the last relation we will
write w1 =K w2. Thus there is no confusion with equality, written = as usual.
4 This glosses over a number of issues on the nature of a revision function, which need not concern us here. See [36,32] for more on this issue.
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(K ∗ 2) α ∈ Bel(K ∗ α).
(K ∗ 3) Bel(K ∗ α) ⊆ Bel(K) + α.
(K ∗ 4) If ¬α /∈ Bel(K) then Bel(K) + α ⊆ Bel(K ∗ α).
(K ∗ 5) Bel(K ∗ α) is inconsistent, only if  ¬α.
(K ∗ 6) If α ≡ β then Bel(K ∗ α) ≡ Bel(K ∗ β).
(K ∗ 7) Bel(K ∗ (α ∧ β)) ⊆ Bel(K ∗ α) + β .
(K ∗ 8) If ¬β /∈ Bel(K ∗ α) then Bel(K ∗ α) + β ⊆ Bel(K ∗ (α ∧ β)).
Thus, the result of revising K by α yields an epistemic state in which α is believed in the corresponding belief set ((K ∗ 1),
(K ∗ 2)); whenever the result is consistent, the revised belief set consists of the expansion of Bel(K) by α ((K ∗ 3), (K ∗ 4));
the only time that Bel(K) is inconsistent is when α is inconsistent ((K ∗ 5)); and revision is independent of the syntactic
form of the formula for revision ((K ∗ 6)). The ﬁrst six postulates are referred to as the basic revision postulates. The last
two postulates are called the supplementary postulates, and deal with the relation between revising by a conjunction and
expansion: whenever consistent, revision by a conjunction corresponds to revision by one conjunct and expansion by the
other. Motivation for these postulates can be found in [16,35]. The intent of these postulates is that they should hold for
any rational belief revision function. We will call a revision operator an AGM revision operator if it satisﬁes the reformulated
AGM postulates. Katsuno and Mendelzon [22] have shown that a necessary and suﬃcient condition for constructing an AGM
revision operator is that any belief state K can induce, as its preferential information, a total preorder on the set of possible
worlds.
Deﬁnition 1. A faithful assignment is a function that maps each belief state K to a total preorder K on ΘP such that for
any w1,w2 ∈ ΘP :
1. If w1,w2 | Bel(K) then w1 =K w2.
2. If w1 | Bel(K) and w2 | Bel(K), then w1 ≺K w2.
The resulting total preorder is referred to as the faithful ranking corresponding to, or induced by K. Intuitively, w1 K w2
if w1 is at least as plausible as w2, according to the agent. As enforced by the ﬁrst condition in Deﬁnition 1, an agent’s
beliefs are characterised by the least worlds in the ordering.
Katsuno and Mendelzon then provide the following representation result, where T (W ) is the set of formulas of classical
logic true in W :
Theorem 1. (See [22].) A revision operator ∗ satisﬁes Postulates (K ∗ 1)–(K ∗ 8) iff there exists a faithful assignment that maps each
belief set K to a total preorder K such that
K ∗ φ = T (min(Mod(φ),K)).
Thus for a belief state K, the agent’s beliefs following revision by a formula α are characterised by those possible worlds
of φ that are most plausible according to the agent. A ranking function K corresponding to belief state K can also be
understood as specifying the (counterfactual) information of what the agent would believe after coming to believe some
formula φ.
2.3. Iterated belief revision
The AGM postulates do not address properties of iterated belief revision. This can be seen by observing that, while
Theorem 1 speciﬁes what the agent’s beliefs will be following a revision by formula φ, it has nothing to say about what
the new ranking function K∗φ should look like. As noted by [32], the only interesting result that follows from the AGM
approach concerning iterated belief revision is the following:
If ¬β /∈ Bel(K ∗ α) then Bel((K ∗ α) ∗ β)= Bel(K ∗ (α ∧ β)).
This has led to the development of extensions of the AGM approach to address iterated revision; the best-known approach
is that of Darwiche and Pearl [9] (DP). They propose the following postulates, adapted according to our notation:
(C1) If β  α, then Bel((K ∗ α) ∗ β) = Bel(K ∗ β).
(C2) If β  ¬α, then Bel((K ∗ α) ∗ β) = Bel(K ∗ β).
(C3) If α ∈ Bel(K ∗ β), then α ∈ Bel((K ∗ α) ∗ β).
(C4) If ¬α /∈ Bel(K ∗ β), then ¬α /∈ Bel((K ∗ α) ∗ β).
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set, this is no different than simply revising by the stronger formula. The other postulates may be given similar informal
readings. As with the AGM postulates, the intent is that these postulates should hold for any rational belief revision function.
Darwiche and Pearl show that an AGM revision operator satisﬁes Postulates (C1)–(C4) iff the way it revises faithful rankings
satisﬁes the (respective) conditions:
(CR1) If w1,w2 | α, then w1 K w2 iff w1 K∗α w2.
(CR2) If w1,w2 | α, then w1 K w2 iff w1 K∗α w2.
(CR3) If w1 | α and w2 | α, then w1 ≺K w2 implies w1 ≺K∗α w2.
(CR4) If w1 | α and w2 | α, then w1 K w2 implies w1 K∗α w2.
These conditions are natural and appealing; moreover they appear to be intuitively very reasonable: When K is revised
by α, Conditions (CR1) and (CR2) require that the relative ranking of any two α-worlds (resp. ¬α-worlds) do not change.
Conditions (CR3) and (CR4) require that if an α-world w1 is (strictly) more plausible than a ¬α-world w2, then following
revision by α, w1 continues to be (strictly) more plausible than w2.
The DP postulates have been criticised in two respects. On one hand, it has been suggested that they are too permissive,
in that they support revision operators which allow arbitrary dependencies among the items of information which an agent
acquires along the way. Consequently, Jin and Thielscher [21] have proposed the so-called postulate of independence5:
(Ind) If ¬α /∈ Bel(K ∗ β) then α ∈ Bel((K ∗ α) ∗ β).
Thus, if a revision of K by β does not rule out α, then if K is ﬁrst revised by α and then by β , α is believed in the
resulting belief set. Postulate (Ind) strengthens both (C3) and (C4). Thus, the suggested set of postulates according to Jin
and Thielscher [21] consists of (C1), (C2), and (Ind). They also give a necessary and suﬃcient condition for an AGM revision
operator to satisfy (Ind):
(IndR) If w1 | α and w2 | ¬α, then w1 K w2 implies w1 ≺K∗α w2.
This condition is also natural: if α is true at w1 and false at w2, and if w1 and w2 are equally plausible, then after revising
by α, w1 is strictly more plausible than w2. If w1 ≺K w2 then we simply have (CR3).
On the other hand, it can be argued that the DP postulates are too strong. In particular, Postulate (C2) has been noted
by many researchers as producing the undesirable result described in Section 1 [28,23,11]. As a further example, consider a
scenario proposed by Konieczny and Pino Pérez [23]:
Example 1. Suppose an electric circuit contains an adder and a multiplier. The atomic propositions a and m denote re-
spectively that the adder and the multiplier are working. Initially we have no information about this circuit; and we then
learn that the adder and the multiplier are working (α = a ∧m). Thereafter, someone tells us that the adder is actually not
working (β = ¬a).
As argued in [23], there is no reason to “forget” that the multiplier is working; however by (C2) we must have (K ∗ α) ∗
β = K ∗ β , since β  ¬α. Hence, in this case (C2) appears to be too strong.
Intuitively, such examples are compelling. However, the case against (C2) isn’t clear cut. First, it can be observed that
many researchers (e.g., [28,23]), who are against (C2) are nonetheless quite happy with Postulate (C1). However, the seman-
tic characterisation of Postulate (C2) (viz. (CR2)) seems as reasonable as that of (C1) (viz. (CR1)): If being informed about α
does not change the relative plausibility of α-worlds, why should the relative ordering of ¬α-worlds be changed? This idea
is also articulated in [37], which argues that in a belief change involving α, the relative ordering between α-worlds remains
unchanged, as it does between ¬α-worlds.
As an informal defense of (C2), it can be observed that in Example 1 it is implicitly assumed that a and m are separate
items of information. However, in the AGM approach, a simultaneous revision by a and m can only be represented by a
conjunction, viz. K ∗ (a ∧ b). What makes Example 1 credible is the fact that there is no apparent relation between being
informed of the adder working and, at the same time, of the multiplier working. Hence learning ¬a would seem to not
inﬂuence belief in m. However, the example can be elaborated upon so that this isn’t necessarily the case. Consider for
example where we are told by someone that both the adder and multiplier are working, and then determine ourselves that
the adder is not working. One might argue plausibly that the original source was suspect, and so it makes sense to give up
in toto all information provided by that source. Thus plausibly in this case one might want to not believe that m was true.6
5 Essentially the same system is discussed in [5], where it is called admissable revision.
6 Another support for (C2) is that it is in fact the only DP postulate which puts additional constraints on the retention of propositional beliefs. To see
this, let’s consider so-called amnesic revision ∗a :
K ∗a α =
{
K + α if K ¬α,
Cn(α) otherwise.
Note that radical as it is, amnesic revision satisﬁes the AGM postulates, (C1), (C3) and (C4), but violates (C2).
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ways. In the ﬁrst interpretation, the agent has been informed that α and β are true; to revise simultaneously by α and β ,
the best that can be done is to revise by their conjunction. In the second interpretation, the agent has been informed of an
item of information, and this item of information has been expressed as a conjunction. Under the ﬁrst interpretation, α and
β are regarded as separate items of information; under this interpretation it is reasonable that (C2) not necessarily hold.
Under the second interpretation, α and β are seen as components of an item of information; here it seems reasonable that
(C2) does hold. Clearly, extant accounts of iterated belief revision are not suﬃciently expressive to deal with both situations.
Thus, Example 1 doesn’t provide a counterexample to (C2), so much as it highlights the limitations of the expressibility
of revision functions. What this suggests then is that AGM revision should be generalised so that both above-mentioned
situations can be handled.
2.4. Conjunctions of formulas vs. sets of formulas
The preceding discussion suggests that K ∗ (α ∧ β) should be treated differently from K ∗ {α,β}. The former case repre-
sents the situation in the AGM framework in which revision is by a formula, here comprised of two conjuncts. In the latter
case, revision is by a set of formulas. An immediate effect of this distinction is that revision now becomes a function whose
second argument is a set of formulas, rather than a single formula. Hence the above distinction is appropriately expressed
as K ∗ {α ∧ β} vs. K ∗ {α,β}.
This distinction between a set of formulas and their conjunction has been noted and explored elsewhere and under
different guises. Perhaps the most direct recognition of this distinction is in [24]. There the comma that appears in an
expression of a set of objects is referred to as “the forgotten connective”. Their interests however concern reasoning under
inconsistency, where one can plausibly make the argument that there are cases where a distinction between {a ∧ b ∧ ¬b}
and {a,b,¬b} is of value.
As well, the distinction between a set of formulas and their conjunction has cropped up in nonmonotonic reason-
ing, speciﬁcally with respect to nonmonotonic inference relations, conditional logics, and related systems (see [25,26,7] for
monotonic systems of defaults, and [33,8,2,29] for nonmonotonic approaches). In these systems, a default “if α then nor-
mally β” can be written α ⇒ β in a conditional logic or α |∼ β in a nonmonotonic inference relation. There is a diﬃculty
with such approaches, in that for defaults α ⇒ β1 and α ⇒ β2 if α is known to be contingently true while β1 is false, one
would still want to conclude β2 by default. Similarly, if α is known to be contingently true, where | α ⇒ γ and γ ⇒ β
is a default, one would want to conclude β by default in general. However these results are diﬃcult to obtain. These is-
sues have been addressed in several ways, but solutions in general have relied on how a default is represented. In [17],
possible worlds are ranked according to the defaults that they violate. In the approach of [18], maximum entropy is used
to essentially assert that things are as normal as possible. The lexicographic closure of a set of defaults [27,4] formalises the
idea that in applying defaults, one prefers to violate a smaller number of defaults to violating a larger number. All these
approaches are syntax dependent, in that they depend on how a set of defaults is represented. In particular, one may ob-
tain different answers for the set of defaults {α ⇒ β1,α ⇒ β2} as opposed to {α ⇒ (β1 ∧ β2)}: if β1 is false, then in the
former case one may still conclude β2 whereas in the latter case the default as a whole is inapplicable. So, roughly, the
intuition underlying the lexicographic closure is that as many defaults are applied as consistently possible, and the results
of this notion of maximum applicability will vary depending on how the defaults are expressed. The focus in the approach
presented here is somewhat different: one revises by a set of formulas S , and this set is accepted. (In particular, if S is
inconsistent then the agent falls into an inconsistent belief state.) If the agent subsequently learns that some elements
of S are in fact false then, where consistent, the remaining elements of S are still believed to be true. So for two sets of
formulas S and S ′ where S ≡ S ′ , the agent’s beliefs will be the same in K ∗ S and K ∗ S ′ , but may differ in subsequent
revisions.
With respect to belief change, a belief base [20] is a set of formulas representing an agent’s beliefs. Since a belief base is
in general not deductively closed, it may be seen as having more structure than the corresponding belief set. Hence belief
change with respect to a belief base may have differing results, depending on how the agent’s beliefs are expressed. For
example, [30] considers a scenario in which the agent’s beliefs are represented by an infobase consisting of a ﬁnite sequence
of formulas. Each formula in the infobase is assumed to be an explicit piece of information, obtained independently from
the other formulas. For contraction, an ordering is speciﬁed over interpretations depending on the number of formulas
in the infobase that they satisfy. Hence if two formulas in an infobase were replaced by their conjunction, one would
expect quite different results. Somewhat similar intuitions are employed for disjunctive maxi-adjustment [3]; see also [39]. An
ordered knowledge base is employed toward conﬂict resolution, for application to tasks such as belief change and information
integration. An ordered knowledge base places a ranking on formulas, which can be seen as a compact representation of
an ordinal conditional function [37]. Interpretations are ranked by the highest formula that they falsify (and given rank 0
if all formulas are satisﬁed). The disjunctive maxi-adjustment is shown to satisfy a lexicographic strategy, which is to say,
essentially a maximal set of formulas for a given rank is selected. Since one is working at the level of formulas, again results
depend on how the formulas are represented.
The preceding approaches to belief change consider a knowledge base as being comprised of a set of (possibly ranked)
formulas. There has also been work in which the input for belief change is a set of formulas, rather than a single formula.
Fuhrmann and Hansson [15] survey multiple contraction; in particular they propose package contraction, which is concerned
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is a subset of K in which α is not believed (except in the case where α is a tautology). The standard construction for
contraction is phrased in terms of remainder sets, or maximal subsets of K that fail to imply α. In a package contraction
such as K − {α,β}, the resulting belief set is one in which neither α nor β is believed. The notion of remainder set
extends naturally in this case to maximal subsets of K that fail to imply either α or β . It can be noted that the package
contraction K − {α,β} is distinct from contraction K − (α ∧ β) or K − (α ∨ β). In the former case, it is possible that
α ∈ K − (α ∧ β) although this is not allowed in the corresponding package contraction. For the latter case, it is possible
that α ∨ β ∈ K − {α,β}, although clearly α ∨ β /∈ K − (α ∨ β). Fuhrmann and Hansson [15] also give a set of postulates for
package contraction analogous to the set of basic postulates for AGM contraction, and they prove a representation result
linking these postulates to the semantic construction.
The multiple contraction in [42] also studies how to contract a belief set so that it is consistent with a set of formulas. In
this work, the authors propose supplementary postulates for multiple contraction and provide a representation result; they
also consider the case where the set for contraction may be inﬁnite. In other work, Fermé et al. [14] examine a construction
for multiple contraction in a (nondeductively-closed) belief base, while Falappa et al. [13] address revision of an arbitrary
set of formulas by a set of explanations, with application to argumentation systems. Last, Delgrande and Wassermann [12]
consider package contraction where the underlying logic is that governing Horn clauses. Here package contraction is of
greater importance than in the case of classical logic, since in classical logic one has the option of contracting by several
formulas via contracting their disjunction. However, the disjunction of Horn clauses in general is not Horn, and so one
requires package contraction to concurrently remove several formulas.
It can be noted that while these approaches to set-based contraction have a syntactic resemblance to the approach
developed here, the emphasis is quite different. In a package or multiple contraction K − S , the resulting belief set in
general is different from a contraction made up of some Boolean combination of members of S . On the other hand, none
of these approaches address iterated operations. In contrast, in our approach it will be seen that the belief set resulting
from K ⊗ S and from K ⊗ {∧S} will be the same. However the faithful rankings resulting from K ⊗ S and K ⊗ {∧S} will in
general be quite different, and this will have signiﬁcant ramiﬁcations for iterated revision.
There has also been work in revision by sets of formulas, in particular the set revision of [41] and multiple revision of [34].
There are two main differences between these approaches and our’s. First, our focus is on iterated revision and, in particular,
constraints that need to be imposed on an agent’s underlying epistemic state in order to effect plausible revisions. Second,
Zhang and Foo [41] and Peppas [34] primarily study inﬁnite sets. In our approach, the focus is on the distinction between
revising by a ﬁnite set of formulas and a corresponding conjunction of those formulas. Therefore, while set revision or
multiple revision might be useful for investigating inﬁnite nonmonotonic reasoning, arguably our approach is more suitable
for modelling the evolution of an agent’s belief state where, at least in a practical setting, an agent will not receive an
inﬁnite set as input. Finally, Nayak [31] anticipates some of the properties of parallel revision, in an approach where both
the belief state and input are represented by epistemic entrenchment relations.
3. Parallel revision
3.1. Intuitions
We have argued that K ∗ {α ∧ β} should be treated differently from K ∗ {α,β}. Hence the epistemic state resulting from
K ∗ {α ∧ β} will in general be different from that resulting from K ∗ {α,β}. However, the logical content of {α ∧ β} and
{α,β} is the same, and so one might reasonably expect that the agent’s beliefs following revision by either of these sets
would be the same. Thus one might reasonably expect that
Bel
(K ∗ {α,β})= Bel(K ∗ {α ∧ β}).
On the right-hand side of the equality we revise by a single item of information, α ∧ β . If β is later shown to be false,
then so too is α ∧ β , and it is reasonable that all original information (including α) may be lost. Hence, possibly α /∈
Bel(K ∗ {α ∧ β} ∗ {¬β}). This argument doesn’t apply to Bel(K ∗ {α,β}), where we revise by a set consisting of two items of
information. Thus if we later revise by ¬β , then one would expect that α ∈ Bel(K ∗ {α,β} ∗ {¬β}) where “reasonable”.7
Semantically, this has the following ramiﬁcations. An agent’s belief state (at least as far as revision is concerned) is
modelled by a faithful ranking on possible worlds. In the faithful ranking that results from the revision K ∗ {α,β}, we have
that the least α∧β worlds are ranked lower than the least ¬(α∧β) worlds in K∗{α,β} . (This is a trivial consequence of the
fact that the least α ∧ β worlds are minimal in K∗{α,β} .) The key intuition in parallel revision is that these considerations
extend to subsets of the set of formulas for revision. Hence, in revising by {α,β}, α and β are accepted as being true.
However, implicit in the revision is the (counterfactual) notion that if β were found to not be true then α would still be
held to be true. Semantically, this means that, among the ¬β worlds, the least α worlds are ranked below the least ¬α
worlds. This then would have the effect that if β were later determined to be false, thus necessitating a revision by ¬β ,
7 A case that is not “reasonable” is where β is of the form α ∨ γ . Then K ∗ {α,β} is the same as K ∗ {α,α ∨ γ }, and clearly one requires that
α /∈ Bel(K ∗ {α,α ∨ γ } ∗ {¬(α ∨ γ )}).
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formulas. Thus, for a set of formulas S , after the revision K ∗ S all elements of S will be believed. Implicit in the resulting
ranking function is the counterfactual notion that if the members of some subset of S , say S ′ , were found to be false, then
S \ S ′ would still be believed to be true. This then has the effect that in K ∗ S ∗ S ′ , members of S \ S ′ will continue to be
believed.
Another way of thinking of the underlying procedure is that in a revision K ∗ S , subsets of S implicitly deﬁne a context
that provides additional structure in the resulting ranking function. That is, in K∗ S , the minimal S worlds are ranked below
all ¬(∧S) worlds. For S ′ ⊂ S , in the “context” of S ′ the same considerations apply. Thus, in the restriction of the ranking
function to S ′ worlds, the minimal S \ S ′ worlds are ranked below all ¬(∧(S \ S ′)) worlds.
Essentially then, for a revision K ∗ S , changes to the underlying ranking on worlds will depend not just on the set S ,
but also on subsets of S . The intuition is that, in revising by S , all elements of S are believed; if some members of S are
subsequently disbelieved then, insofar as possible, the remaining members of S are still believed. In the next section we
formalise this intuition. The approach is independent of previous approaches to iterated revision, in that it can be combined
with an existing approach to iterated revision to yield a “parallel” hybrid of that approach. Consequently, in the following
section we combine the basic approach with that of [21] to yield what we suggest is the appropriate general model for
iterated belief revision.
3.2. The basic approach
This section describes the basic approach to parallel revision, in which new information for revision is represented by a
ﬁnite set of formulas. The intuition is that each formula of the set represents an undecomposable (with regards to revision)
piece of information. To distinguish this from standard belief revision, we denote a parallel revision operator by ⊗. Formally,
⊗ maps a belief state K and ﬁnite set of formulas S to a revised belief state K ⊗ S . We assume henceforth that the second
argument to ⊗ is a ﬁnite, nonempty8 set of formulas.
To begin, we adapt the AGM postulates for revision by a set of formulas. The following are analogous to postulates given
in [34], adapted for belief states:
(K ⊗ 1) Cn(Bel(K ⊗ S)) = Bel(K ⊗ S).
(K ⊗ 2) S ⊆ Bel(K ⊗ S).
(K ⊗ 3) Bel(K ⊗ S) ⊆ Bel(K) + S .
(K ⊗ 4) If Bel(K) ∪ S is consistent, then Bel(K) + S ⊆ Bel(K ⊗ S).
(K ⊗ 5) Bel(K ⊗ S) is inconsistent iff S is inconsistent.
(K ⊗ 6) If S1 ≡ S2, then Bel(K ⊗ S1) = Bel(K ⊗ S2).
(K ⊗ 7) Bel(K ⊗ (S1 ∪ S2)) ⊆ Bel(K ⊗ S1) + S2.
(K ⊗ 8) If Bel(K ⊗ S1) ∪ S2 is consistent, then Bel(K ⊗ S1) + S2 ⊆ Bel(K ⊗ (S1 ∪ S2)).
Note that (K ⊗ 6) yields Bel(K ⊗ S) = Bel(K ⊗ {∧S}). With a slight abuse of terminology, we will also refer to revision
operators that satisfy the above postulates as AGM revision operators.
It has been shown in [34] that the representation theorem of Grove [19] can be generalised to revision by a set of
formulas. Given that we deal with a ﬁnite language, the systems of spheres of Grove’s construction are interdeﬁnable with
faithful rankings, and so the representation theorem of [22] can also be generalised:
A revision operator ⊗ satisﬁes (K ⊗ 1)–(K ⊗ 8) iff there exists a faithful ranking K for an arbitrary belief state K, such
that for any set of sentences S:
Bel(K ⊗ S) = T (min(Mod(S),K)). (2)
For the basic approach to parallel revision, we give two postulates and semantic conditions that characterise the ap-
proach.
The following postulates characterise the basic approach to parallel revision:
(P⊗) For S1 ⊂ S , where S1 ∪ (S \ S1)  ⊥,
S1 ⊆ Bel
(K ⊗ S ⊗ (S \ S1)).
8 This differs from [10], which allowed the empty set, but is in agreement with [34]. There are several reasons for this change. Foremost, it is not clear
that revision by the empty set is a meaningful operation, since K ∗ ∅ would seem to have the informal interpretation of revising in the absence of a report
of information. Second, it eases the technical development. Last, while revision by ∅ could be equated most naturally with revision by {}, the resulting
revision K∗ {} isn’t entirely trivial, since in the case that Bel(K) is inconsistent (K∗5) stipulates that the revision by the empty set is suﬃcient to extract
an agent from the inconsistent belief state.
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(K ⊗ (S1 ∪ (S \ S1)))= Bel(K ⊗ S ⊗ (S1 ∪ (S \ S1))).
(P⊗) is a postulate of success preservation. It asserts that for a revision of K by S , a subset S1 ⊂ S is preserved in revising
by the negations of members of S \ S1 whenever it is consistent to do so. This reﬂects the intuition that, in revising by S
and after which some members of S are subsequently disbelieved, then insofar as possible the remaining members of S are
still believed. (S⊗) expresses the fact that for set S and subset S1 ⊂ S , revising by S1 ∪ (S \ S1) yields the same beliefs as
ﬁrst revising by S and then by S1 ∪ (S \ S1). Thus it expresses a condition of conservativism with respect to iterated belief.
These postulates can be combined as follows:
(PP⊗) Let S1 ⊂ S where S1 ∪ (S \ S1)  ⊥.
Then Bel(K ⊗ S ⊗ (S \ S1)) = Bel(K ⊗ (S1 ∪ (S \ S1))).
Thus revising by a set S and then the negations of some members of S yields the same belief set as revising by the
negations of these members in S together with the remaining members of S .
We obtain the following result:
Proposition 1. Suppose ⊗ is a revision operator satisfying Postulates (K⊗1)–(K⊗8). Then ⊗ satisﬁes (PP⊗) if and only if it satisﬁes
(P⊗) and (S⊗).
In order to justify the Postulates (P⊗) and (S⊗), we turn next to the corresponding conditions on faithful orderings.
From a semantic point of view, consider the following condition on a faithful ranking K⊗S deﬁned in terms of a faithful
ranking K:
(P⊗R) Let S1 ⊂ S where S1 ∪ (S \ S1)  ⊥. Then
min
(
Mod(S \ S1),K⊗S
)⊆Mod(S1).
(S⊗R) Let S1 ⊂ S . Then
min
(
Mod
(
S1 ∪ (S \ S1)
)
,K
)=min(Mod(S1 ∪ (S \ S1)),K⊗S).
Unsurprisingly, these conditions can also be combined into the single condition:
(PP⊗R) Let S1 ⊂ S where S1 ∪ (S \ S1)  ⊥. Then
min
(
Mod
(
S1 ∪ (S \ S1)
)
,K
)=min(Mod(S \ S1),K⊗S).
Thus, informally, for S1 ⊂ S , the minimum S1 ∪ (S \ S1) worlds in a faithful ranking are just the minimum (S \ S1)
worlds following revision by S . This in turn means that following revision by S , S1 will be true at the least (S \ S1) worlds,
as desired.
Proposition 2. Suppose K is a faithful ranking. Then K satisﬁes (PP⊗R) if and only if it satisﬁes (P⊗R) and (S⊗R).
For illustration, consider the following examples:
Example 2. Let P = {a,b}, and let the agent’s faithful ranking be given as follows:
{ab} ≺K {ab} ≺K {ab} ≺K {ab}.
Thus Bel(K) = Cn(a∧¬b). There are three possible faithful rankings resulting from K ⊗ {a,b} = K′:
{ab} ≺K′ {ab} ≺K′ {ab} ≺K′ {ab},
{ab} ≺K′ {ab} ≺K′ {ab} ≺K′ {ab},
{ab} ≺K′ {ab,ab} ≺K′ {ab}.
This example is very simple. In fact it can be observed in the example that, since the possible worlds correspond to
subsets of {a,b}, the possible outcomes are independent of the initial belief state K. The next example is a little more
complicated.
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{abc,abc} ≺K {abc,abc,abc} ≺K {abc,abc,abc}.
For K ⊗ {a,b} = K′ , three possible faithful rankings are as follows:
{abc} ≺K′ {abc,abc} ≺K′ {abc} ≺K′ {abc,abc} ≺K′ {abc,abc},
{abc} ≺K′ {abc,abc,abc,abc} ≺K′ {abc,abc} ≺K′ {abc},
{abc} ≺K′ {abc} ≺K′ {abc,abc,abc} ≺K′ {abc} ≺K′ {abc} ≺K′ {abc}.
Thus Bel(K) = Cn(a ∧¬b) and Bel(K′) = Cn(a ∧ b ∧ c). Two properties can be observed for each of the example rankings
for K′ . First, for any S1 ⊆ S = {a,b}, the minimum S1 ∪ (S \ S1) worlds are the same in K and K′ . Thus the minimum {a,b}
worlds in each case is given by {abc}, and the minimum {a,¬b} worlds is given by {abc,abc}. Second, for any S2 ⊂ S1 ⊆
S = {a,b}, the minimum S1 ∪ (S \ S1) worlds are ranked strictly lower than the minimum S2 ∪ (S \ S2) worlds. Hence, the
minimum {a,b} worlds are ranked strictly lower than the minimum {a,¬b} and {¬a,b} worlds, and these latter sets are
strictly lower than the minimum {¬a,¬b} worlds.
Otherwise, for the three rankings given in the example, the ﬁrst is not particularly special one way or another. The
second, in a sense, is the most compact possible ranking, in that worlds are positioned as low in the ranking as possible.
The third ranking has the property that for S2 ⊂ S1 ⊆ S , every S1 ∪ (S \ S1) world is ranked below every S2 ∪ (S \ S2) world.
This last example can be seen as extending the approach of Nayak et al. [32] or Jin and Thielscher [21] to apply to subsets
of a set for revision; we develop this latter point in Section 4 with regards to [21].
The next result expresses basic properties of faithful rankings that satisfy (P⊗R) and (S⊗R).
Proposition 3. Let K be a belief state and letK be the faithful ranking induced by K. Let ⊗ revise faithful rankings corresponding to
an AGM revision operator, and let K⊗S be a faithful ranking satisfying (P⊗R) and (S⊗R).
1. Let S1 ⊂ S be such that S1 ∪ (S \ S1) is consistent.
Then min(Mod(S \ S1),K⊗S) =min(Mod(S1 ∪ (S \ S1)),K⊗S).
2. Let S2 ⊂ S1 ⊂ S and S2  S1 .
If w1 ∈min(Mod(S \ S1),K⊗S) and w2 ∈min(Mod(S \ S2),K⊗S) then w1 ≺K⊗S w2 .
The ﬁrst part expresses the fundamental intuition underlying the approach: after revising by a set of formulas S , in
the resulting faithful ordering restricted to (S \ S1) worlds, the least S1 worlds will be ranked lower than any world in
which S1 isn’t true. The second part expresses another fundamental property of the approach, that after revising by a set S ,
for S2 ⊂ S1 ⊂ S , the minimum (S \ S1) worlds are ranked below the minimum (S \ S2) worlds. Both parts refer to the
faithful ranking corresponding to K ⊗ S . Together they can be thought of as expressing a relation among conditional (or
counterfactual) beliefs; that is, after revising by S , the faithful ranking given by K ⊗ S reﬂects the counterfactual assertion
that if some members of S were determined to be false, the remaining elements of S would still be believed to be true.
Hence if a revision by S were in fact followed by a revision wherein some members of S were asserted to be false, the
remaining elements of S would be believed to be true.
We obtain the representation result:
Theorem 2. Let ⊗ be a revision operator satisfying Postulates (K ⊗ 1)–(K ⊗ 8).
1. ⊗ satisﬁes (P⊗) iff it revises faithful rankings according to (P⊗R).
2. ⊗ satisﬁes (S⊗) iff it revises faithful rankings according to (S⊗R).
An AGM revision operator that satisﬁes Postulates (P⊗) and (S⊗) will be referred to as a (basic) parallel revision operator.
We have shown that in revising by a set of formulas S , and then revising by the negations of some subset S ′ of S , that
the remaining members of S will continue to be believed. The next result shows that if we revise by a set of formulas S ,
and then revise where some formulas of a subset S ′ of S are false (but it is not necessarily known which), then the other
formulas in S will continue to be believed. This result is more or less a corollary to the factoring result in AGM revision in
the context of parallel revision.
Proposition 4. Let ⊗ be a basic parallel revision operator and let S1 ⊂ S.
Then S1 ⊆ Bel(K ⊗ S ⊗ {∨(S \ S1)}).
Thus, if all we know is that some members of S \ S1 are false, then S1 will still be believed after revising by S followed
by ∨(S \ S1).
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K will be some belief state and S will be a set of formulas. α, β , γ will be logically independent formulas, that is, for
φ1, φ2 ∈ {α,β,γ } if φ1  φ2 then φ1 = φ2.
The ﬁrst example considers the situation where the elements of the set for revision are independent.
Example 4. Consider K ⊗ S where S = {α,β,γ }.
We get that in a faithful ranking resulting from the revision K⊗S , the least {α,β,γ } worlds are strictly less than the
least {α,β,¬γ } worlds, which in turn are strictly less than the least {α,¬β,¬γ } worlds.
Consequently we obtain:
α ∧ γ ∈ Bel(K ⊗ {α,β,γ } ⊗ {¬β}),
α ∈ Bel(K ⊗ {α,β,γ } ⊗ {¬β,¬γ }),
α ∈ Bel(K ⊗ {α,β,γ } ⊗ {¬β ∨¬γ }).
The ﬁrst two parts illustrate the basic property of the approach in the case of logically independent formulas: that
revising by a set of formulas, then by the negation of some members of the set leaves the remaining elements still in the
agent’s belief set. The last part illustrates the result given in Proposition 4.
In the next example, the elements of the set for revision are not independent.
Example 5. Consider K ⊗ S where S = {α,α ∧ β,γ }.
We obtain:
α ∧ γ ∈ Bel(K ⊗ {α,α ∧ β,γ } ⊗ {¬β}),
γ ∈ Bel(K ⊗ {α,α ∧ β,γ } ⊗ {¬α}).
On the other hand, there are resulting faithful rankings in which
β /∈ Bel(K ⊗ {α,α ∧ β,γ } ⊗ {¬α}).
In the ﬁrst case, since β is believed to be false, then α ∧ β must certainly also be false. On the other hand, the other
elements of the set, α and γ continue to be believed after revision by ¬β . Similarly in the second part, if α is false, then
γ can continue to be believed.
The following two examples illustrate a very interesting phenomenon, that the approach can be used to express a pref-
erence over which formulas are accepted.
Example 6. Consider K ⊗ S where S = {α,α ∧ β}.
With respect to the agent’s contingent beliefs, revision by {α,α ∧ β} is of course the same as revision by {α ∧ β}.
However, we also obtain:
α ∈ Bel(K ⊗ {α,α ∧ β} ⊗ {¬α ∨¬β}).
That is, in revising by {α,α ∧ β}, we effectively encode the preference that if one of α or β are to be subsequently
given up, then β will be given up and α retained. In terms of faithful rankings, we have the following. After revising K by
S = {α,α ∧ β}, at the minimum worlds in the resulting ranking, {α,α ∧ β} will be true. For subsets S1 of S , we must have
that S1 ∪ (S \ S1) is consistent. This will be the case for S1 = {α} and (PP⊗R) stipulates that the minimum ¬α ∨¬β worlds
in the ranking associated with K ⊗ S is the same as the minimum {α} ∪ {(α ∧ β)} = {α ∧ ¬β} worlds associated with K.
Hence in revising by S and then {¬α ∨¬β}, we get that {α ∧¬β} is true in the resulting belief set.
Example 7. Consider K ⊗ S where S = {α,α ∨ β}.
Clearly, for atoms α, β , we don’t generally obtain that β ∈ Bel(K ⊗ {α,α ∨ β}), since the logical content of {α,α ∨ β} is
equivalent to that of {α}.
However, we do obtain:
β ∈ Bel(K ⊗ {α,α ∨ β} ⊗ {¬α}).
Thus, after revising by {α,α ∨ β} we don’t necessarily believe that β is true; however we do believe that β is true on
subsequently revising by {¬α}. This result, on reﬂection, is to be expected: In revising by a set, if one of the elements of the
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Thus in revising by {α,α ∨ β}, if α were subsequently determined to be false then the remaining element, viz. α ∨ β would
remain true. But since α is now believed false, this requires that β is now believed to be true. Thus in this case in revising
by {α,α ∨ β}, a preference is established between α and β , to the effect of “accept α, but if it is subsequently found to be
false, accept β”.
The next two examples deal with revising by a set of formulas where the set is inconsistent. In the ﬁrst case, individual
elements of the set are consistent; in the second, some member of the set is inconsistent. In both cases, we obtain desirable
results in subsequent revisions. This illustrates that, even though revision by an inconsistent set is deﬁned to yield an
inconsistent belief set, the underlying faithful ranking nonetheless retains nontrivial information about the agent’s belief
state.
Example 8. Consider K ⊗ S where S = {α,¬α,β,γ }.
Obviously Bel(K ⊗ {α,¬α,β,γ }) is inconsistent. However we obtain the following:
β ∧ γ ∈ Bel(K ⊗ {α,¬α,β,γ } ⊗ {α}),
⊥ /∈ Bel(K ⊗ {α,¬α,β,γ } ⊗ {α}),
β ∧ γ ∈ Bel(K ⊗ {α,¬α,β,γ } ⊗ {α ∨¬α}),
γ ∈ Bel(K ⊗ {α,¬α,β,γ } ⊗ {¬β}).
Analogous results obtain when an element of the set for revision is inconsistent.
Example 9. Consider K ⊗ S where S = {⊥,α,β}.
We obtain:
β ∈ Bel(K ⊗ {⊥,α,β} ⊗ {α}),
β ∈ Bel(K ⊗ {⊥,α,β} ⊗ {¬α}),
⊥ /∈ Bel(K ⊗ {⊥,α,β} ⊗ {α}).
4. Parallel revision and iterated revision
The basic approach only deals with limited situations where we ﬁrst revise by a set of formulas then by the negations of
some of these formulas. In this section, we extend the basic approach to deal with more general cases. We ﬁrst show that
the straightforward generalisation of the well-known iterated revision postulates are problematic and insuﬃcient. Then, we
present a postulate of evidence retainment, which offers an alternative that avoids these diﬃculties.
We start with the following generalisation of the DP postulates to sets of formulas, as suggested by [40]:
(C1⊗) If S2  S1, then Bel((K ⊗ S1) ⊗ S2) = Bel(K ⊗ S2).
(C2⊗) If S1 ∪ S2 is inconsistent, then Bel((K ⊗ S1) ⊗ S2) = Bel(K ⊗ S2).
(C3⊗) If S1 ⊆ Bel(K ⊗ S2), then S1 ⊆ Bel((K ⊗ S1) ⊗ S2).
(C4⊗) If S1 ∪ Bel(K ⊗ S2) is consistent, then S1 ∪ Bel((K ⊗ S1) ⊗ S2) is also consistent.
We remark that, while (C1⊗), (C3⊗) and (C4⊗) still seem as reasonable as their counterparts, (C2⊗) is not desirable. First,
previous criticisms of (C2) apply equally well to (C2⊗). Second, (C2⊗) is clearly inconsistent with (P⊗) in the presence of
the (adapted to sets) AGM postulates. As a speciﬁc example, let α and β be logically independent formulas, and assume
that ¬α ∈ Bel(K) and β /∈ Bel(K). Then (C2⊗) dictates that Bel(K ⊗ {α,β} ⊗ {¬β}) = Bel(K ⊗ {¬β}) = Bel(K) + {¬β}. Thus
¬α ∈ Bel(K⊗{α,β}⊗{¬β}). On the other hand, (P⊗) requires that {α} ⊆ Bel(K⊗{α,β}⊗{¬β}). Hence, we do not consider
(C2⊗) further as a general postulate for parallel revision.
For reference, the semantical conditions for the DP postulates can be generalised as follows:
(C1⊗R) If w1,w2 | S , then w1 K w2 iff w1 K⊗S w2.
(C2⊗R) If w1,w2 | S , then w1 K w2 iff w1 K⊗S w2.
(C3⊗R) If w1 | S and w2 | S , then w1 ≺K w2 implies w1 ≺K⊗S w2.
(C4⊗R) If w1 | S and w2 | S , then w1 K w2 implies w1 K⊗S w2.
To show (C2⊗) is undesirable from another perspective, one may argue that (C2⊗R) is overly strong: in the case where w2
satisﬁes more sentences of S than w1, it is perfectly reasonable that we might have w2 ≺K⊗S w1 even if w1 K w2.
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(Ind⊗) If S1 ∪ Bel(K ⊗ S2) is consistent, then S1 ⊆ Bel((K ⊗ S1) ⊗ S2).
(Ind⊗R) If w1 | S and w2 | S , then w1 K w2 implies w1 ≺K⊗S w2.
Note that, among the above-mentioned postulates, (C2⊗) is the only one which deals with the case where S1 and S2 are
jointly inconsistent. This suggests that we need some new postulates in order to address this situation. As already argued,
it is too radical to give up all formulas of S1 (as imposed by (C⊗2)) just because S1 ∪ S2 is inconsistent. The question is,
in revising by S1 and then S2 when S1 ∪ S2 is inconsistent, what formulas in S1 should be retained? Intuitively, a formula
α ∈ S1 should be kept if there is no evidence (in S1 and S2) against α after learning S2. To formalise this idea, we need the
following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 2. Let S1, S2 be two sets of sentences. We denote by S1||S2 the set of all subsets of S1 that are consistent
with S2. That is Sc ∈ S1||S2 iff:
1. Sc ⊆ S1.
2. Sc ∪ S2 is consistent.
Formally, the fact that there exists evidence in S1 against α after learning S2 (given the original belief state K) can be
expressed as: ∃Sc ∈ S1||S2 such that ¬α ∈ Bel(K ⊗ (Sc ∪ S2)).
Based on these considerations, we obtain the so-called postulate of evidence retainment:
If α ∈ S1 and α /∈ Bel
(
(K ⊗ S1) ⊗ S2
)
, then ∃Sc ∈ S1||S2 such that ¬α ∈ Bel
(K ⊗ (Sc ∪ S2)).
This postulate is inspired by the postulate of core retainment [20], which says a formula α is removed from a belief set K
by a contraction with β only if there is some evidence in K that shows that α contributes to the implication of β . Formally,
core retainment is expressed as follows:
If α ∈ K and α /∈ K − β, then ∃A ⊆ K such that A  β but A ∪ α  β.
The postulate of evidence retainment can be equivalently rephrased as follows:
(Ret⊗) If α ∈ S1, and for every Sc ∈ S1||S2 where S2 = ∅ we have ¬α /∈ Bel(K ⊗ (Sc ∪ S2)), then
α ∈ Bel((K ⊗ S1) ⊗ S2).
Recall Example 1 with S1 = {a,m} and S2 = {¬a}. Since S1||S2 = {{m}}, Postulate (Ret⊗) implies that (K ⊗ S1) ⊗ S2 m,
which gives us the desired result. Note that, in case a and m make up a single piece of information (i.e. S1 = {a ∧ m}),
Postulate (Ret⊗) does not apply.
To give a formal justiﬁcation for (Ret⊗), we will show a representation theorem.
Deﬁnition 3. Let S be a set of sentences and w a possible world. Then S|w denotes the set of elements of S which are true
in w , i.e., S|w = {α ∈ S | w | α}.
The following theorem gives a necessary and suﬃcient semantical condition for (Ret⊗):
Theorem 3. Suppose ⊗ is a parallel revision operator satisfying Postulates (K ⊗ 1)–(K ⊗ 8). Then ⊗ satisﬁes (Ret⊗) iff it revises
faithful rankings in the following manner:
(Ret⊗R) If S|w2 ⊂ S|w1 , then w1 K w2 implies that w1 ≺K⊗S w2 .
Arguably, (Ret⊗R) is very natural and intuitive. It essentially says: if w1 conﬁrms more new information (in S) than w2,
and w1 is at least as plausible as w2, then w1 becomes more plausible than w2 after revising by S . It is not diﬃcult to see
that (Ret⊗) implies (Ind⊗).
Proposition 5. Suppose ⊗ is a parallel revision operator satisfying Postulates (K ⊗ 1)–(K ⊗ 8). Then ⊗ satisﬁes (Ret⊗) only if it
satisﬁes (Ind⊗).
For the effect of (Ret⊗), consider the following example.
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γ be logically independent formulas.
We obtain:
If ¬α /∈ Bel(K ⊗ {¬β,γ }) then α ∈ Bel(K ⊗ {α,β} ⊗ {¬β,γ }).
On the other hand, there is a revision operator ⊗ satisfying Postulates (K ⊗ 1)–(K ⊗ 8), (K ⊗ P ), and (K ⊗ S), but not
(Ret⊗), such that
¬α /∈ Bel(K ⊗ {¬β,γ }) and α /∈ Bel(K ⊗ {α,β} ⊗ {¬β,γ }).
The examples of the previous section are of the form K ⊗ S ⊗ T where members of T were denials of elements of S .
In the basic approach to parallel revision, it is possible to have α /∈ Bel(K ⊗ {α,β} ⊗ {¬β,γ }) because, after the revision
K⊗{α,β}, the minimal ¬β worlds will also have α be true, as expected. However, the minimal ¬β worlds may also happen
to have ¬γ also be true; the basic approach places no constraints on the minimal ¬β ∧ γ worlds, and at these worlds it is
quite possible that α not be true. On the other hand, (Ret⊗) guarantees that α is believed following the revisions by {α,β}
and {¬β,γ }, provided ¬α is not believed in a revision by {¬β,γ }. Informally, in revising by {α,β}, we have that α will be
believed, and in the subsequent revision {¬β,γ } if there is no reason to disbelieve α.
Based on similar considerations, we present two additional postulates which also seem quite intuitive, and which natu-
rally extend (C3⊗) and (C4⊗).
(PC3⊗) If for every Sc ∈ S1||S2 where S2 = ∅ we have that α ∈ Bel(K ⊗ (Sc ∪ S2)), then α ∈ Bel((K ⊗ S1) ⊗ S2).
(PC4⊗) If for every Sc ∈ S1||S2 where S2 = ∅ we have that ¬α /∈ Bel(K ⊗ (Sc ∪ S2)), then ¬α /∈ Bel((K ⊗ S1) ⊗ S2).
Essentially, (PC3⊗) says if all evidence in S1 supports α after learning S2, then α must be believed; (PC4⊗) says if no
evidence in S1 is against α, then there is no reason to believe ¬α. We present a representation theorem for (PC3⊗) and
(PC4⊗) as the formal justiﬁcation.
Theorem 4. Suppose ⊗ is a parallel revision operator satisfying Postulates (K ⊗ 1)–(K ⊗ 8). Then ⊗ satisﬁes (PC3⊗) and (PC4⊗) iff
it revises faithful rankings in the following manner:
(PC3⊗R) If S|w2 ⊆ S|w1 , then w1 ≺K w2 implies w1 ≺K⊗S w2 .
(PC4⊗R) If S|w2 ⊆ S|w1 , then w1 K w2 implies w1 K⊗S w2 .
It can be observed that (PC3⊗R) and (PC4⊗R) extend (C3⊗R) and (C4⊗R), respectively.
Proposition 6. Suppose ⊗ is a parallel revision operator satisfying Postulates (K ⊗ 1)–(K ⊗ 8). Then ⊗ satisﬁes (PC3⊗) only if it
satisﬁes (C3⊗); and ⊗ satisﬁes (PC4⊗) only if it satisﬁes (C4⊗).
Moreover, the semantical conditions of (PC3⊗R) and (PC4⊗R) require that the relative ordering of two possible worlds
remain unchanged, provided they satisfy the same subset of the new information.
Proposition 7. (PC3⊗R) and (PC3⊗R) imply the following semantical condition:
If S|w2 = S|w1, then w1 K w2 iff w1 K⊗S w2.
It is not diﬃcult to see that (PC3⊗) and (PC4⊗) together imply (C1⊗) and (K ⊗ S).
Proposition 8. Suppose⊗ is a parallel revision operator satisfying Postulates (K⊗1)–(K⊗8). If⊗ satisﬁes (PC3⊗) and (PC4⊗) then
it also satisﬁes (C1⊗) and (K ⊗ S).
As well, (P⊗) does not follow from (Ret⊗), (PC3⊗), and (PC4⊗); we give an example in terms of the corresponding
semantical conditions.9 Consider the language over propositional atoms a and b, and the faithful ranking K given by:
{ab} ≺K {ab} ≺K {ab} ≺K {ab}.
Assume that after revising by S = {a,b} the faithful ranking K⊗S is given by:
{ab} ≺K⊗S {ab} ≺K⊗S {ab} ≺K⊗S {ab}.
It can be veriﬁed that K⊗S satisﬁes (Ret⊗R), (PC3⊗R), and (PC4⊗R), but not (P⊗R).
9 We are indebted to a reviewer for this example.
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for iterated revision. It has already been noted that (P⊗), and so (PP⊗), does not follow from (Ret⊗). However, we can show
that a weakened version of (PP⊗) does follow from (Ret⊗). Consider the following weaker versions of (PP⊗) and (PP⊗R):
(PP⊗′ ) Let S1 ⊂ S where S1 ∪ Bel(K ⊗ (S \ S1)) is consistent. Then
Bel
(K ⊗ S ⊗ (S \ S1))= Bel(K ⊗ (S1 ∪ (S \ S1))).
(PP⊗R′) Let S1 ⊂ S where S1 ∪ Bel(K ⊗ (S \ S1)) is consistent. Then
min
(
Mod
(
S1 ∪ (S \ S1)
)
,K
)=min(Mod(S \ S1),K⊗S).
It is not diﬃcult to see that (Ret⊗), (PC3⊗) and (PC4⊗) together imply (PP⊗′).
Proposition 9. Suppose ⊗ is a parallel revision operator satisfying Postulates (K ⊗ 1)–(K ⊗ 8). If ⊗ satisﬁes (Ret⊗), (PC3⊗) and
(PC4⊗) then it also satisﬁes (PP⊗′ ).
Based on the above development, we suggest a general parallel revision operator should satisfy the AGM postulates
(extended to sets), (P⊗), (Ret⊗), (PC3⊗), and (PC4⊗).
5. OCF-based parallel revision
Up to this point, we have considered those properties that parallel revision, regarded a mathematical function, should
satisfy. We now present a concrete parallel revision operator which satisﬁes all the proposed postulates. The operator is
based on Spohn’s proposal of ordinal conditional functions [37].
Originally, an ordinal conditional function (OCF) was deﬁned as a mapping κ from the set of possible worlds ΘP to
the class of ordinals such that some world was assigned the value 0. An OCF provides one concrete form of a belief state.
As in [38], for the sake of simplicity, we take the signature of an OCF κ as ΘP → N, where κ(w) is called the rank of
w . Intuitively, the rank of a world represents its degree of plausibility. The lower a world’s rank, the more plausible that
world is. A formula α is in the belief set Bel(κ) just if every world of rank 0 is a model of α; that is:
Mod
(
Bel(κ)
)= {w ∣∣ κ(w) = 0}.
The corresponding faithful ranking can be deﬁned as follows:
w1 κ w2 iff κ(w1) κ(w2). (3)
Given an OCF κ , we extend this function to a ranking on sentences (or sets of sentences) as follows:
κ(μ) =
{∞ if  ¬μ,
min{κ(w) | w | μ} otherwise .
Put in words, the rank of a sentence is the lowest rank of a world in which the sentence holds.
In what follows we give a concrete parallel revision function in terms of an OCF. That is, for a given OCF κ and ﬁnite set
of formulas S , we deﬁne a revised OCF κ ⊗ S; the corresponding faithful ranking can then be obtained via (3).
Consider for reference the semantic conditions for parallel revision:
(P⊗R) Let S1 ⊂ S where S1 ∪ (S \ S1)  ⊥. Then min(Mod(S \ S1),K⊗S) ⊆Mod(S1).
(Ret⊗R) If S|w2 ⊂ S|w1, then w1 K w2 implies that w1 ≺K⊗S w2.
(PC3⊗R) If S|w2 ⊆ S|w1, then w1 ≺K w2 implies w1 ≺K⊗S w2.
(PC4⊗R) If S|w2 ⊆ S|w1, then w1 K w2 implies w1 K⊗S w2.
We will use the following notation: Let S be a ﬁnite set of formulas, and let S1 ⊆ S .
Cs(S1) = S1 ∪ (S \ S1),
min(μ,κ) = {w ∣∣ w | μ, and for every w ′ where κ(w ′)< κ(w),w ′ | μ}.
Mnemonically, Cs(S1) is the “completion” of S1 with respect to S: If α ∈ S \ S1 then ¬α ∈ Cs(S1). min(μ,κ) is the set of
least μ worlds with respect to κ . We also use min(S, κ) for a set of formulas S to denote the κ-least set of S-worlds.
The construction of κ ⊗ S is given in terms of a recurrence relation. The deﬁnition is admittedly somewhat complicated,
although each part of the deﬁnition reﬂects a basic intuition concerning postulates of parallel OCF revision. Consequently,
after presenting the deﬁnition, we discuss intuitions underlying the parts of the deﬁnition, and then provide a formal
statement that shows that the deﬁnition indeed speciﬁes a general parallel revision operator.
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Deﬁnition 4. Let κ be an ordinal conditional function over ΘP and let S be a ﬁnite satisﬁable set of sentences. Deﬁne the
parallel OCF revision of κ by S , κ ⊗ S , by
1. If w ∈min(S, κ) then (κ ⊗ S)(w) = 0.
2. Assume that (κ ⊗ S)(w1) has been assigned for every w1 ∈ ΘP where w1 ∈ min(Cs(S1), κ), and where S1 ⊆ S and
|S| − |S1| < i for i > 0.
Let w2 ∈min(Cs(S2), κ) where S2 ⊂ S and |S| − |S2| = i. Then
(κ ⊗ S)(w2) =max
{
(κ ⊗ S)(Cs(S ′1)), (4)
(κ ⊗ S)(Cs(S ′1))+ κ(Cs(S2))− κ(Cs(S ′1)) (5)∣∣ S2 ⊂ S ′1 ⊆ S and ∣∣S ′1∣∣+ 1= |S2|}+ 1.
3. For w /∈min(Cs(S|w), κ),
(κ ⊗ S)(w) = (κ ⊗ S)(Cs(S|w))+ κ(w) − κ(Cs(S|w)).
Each part of the deﬁnition applies to a particular set of worlds with respect to κ . The ﬁrst condition in the deﬁnition
applies to minimum S worlds in κ , and ensures that these worlds are given rank 0 in κ ⊗ S; the remaining conditions
implicitly assign a rank greater than 0 to all other worlds. The second part of the deﬁnition assigns ranks in κ ⊗ S to
minimum (in κ ) Cs(S1) worlds for every S1 ⊂ S . This part is phrased iteratively, working from larger subsets of S to
smaller. The third part of the deﬁnition assigns ranks in κ ⊗ S to all remaining worlds.
Intuitively the various postulates are obtained as follows. Since the set of 0-ranked worlds in κ ⊗ S is the same as the
minimum S worlds in κ , and since every world is assigned a rank in κ ⊗ S , it follows that κ ⊗ S deﬁnes a faithful ranking.
Thus, via [22] we have an AGM revision operator. (P⊗R) is obtained by requiring, for S2 ⊂ S1 ⊆ S where |S2|+1= |S1|, that
(κ ⊗ S)(Cs(S2)) (κ ⊗ S)(Cs(S1))+ 1.
That is, in κ ⊗ S the rank of the least Cs(S2) worlds is greater than the rank of the least Cs(S1) worlds. This is taken care of
by (4) in the deﬁnition. The general case, where |S2| + i = |S1| for i > 0 follows trivially by transitivity of . (PC3⊗R) and
(PC4⊗R) are obtained by a condition similar to that in [9], adjusted for subsets of a set of formulas for revision: For worlds
w1 and w2 where we have S1|w1 = S1|w2 for S1 ⊆ S , we require that the difference in rankings between w1 and w2 will
be the same in κ ⊗ S as in κ . Condition 3 of the deﬁnition ensures that this is the case. (Ret⊗R) is trickier; refer to Fig. 1,
where we have that κ(w1) = κ(w2), and assume that w1 ∈ Mod(Cs(S1)) and w2 ∈ Mod(Cs(S2)). The minimum Cs(S1) and
Cs(S2) worlds are indicated by arrows on the κ ranking. A potential problem arises, in that to this point there is nothing to
prevent
(κ ⊗ S)(Cs(S2))− (κ ⊗ S)(Cs(S1))< κ(Cs(S2))− κ(Cs(S1)).
Our constraints for (PC3⊗R) and (PC4⊗R) require that the respective distances d1 and d2 be the same in κ and κ ⊗ S , and
this would yield that
(κ ⊗ S)(w2) − (κ ⊗ S)(w1) < 0.
This in turn violates (Ret⊗R). Condition (5) in the deﬁnition ensures that this doesn’t occur, and so that (Ret⊗R) is satisﬁed.
To establish formally that the deﬁnition indeed stipulates a parallel OCF revision function, we ﬁrst state several small
results that identify pertinent facts concerning the deﬁnition.
First, the deﬁnition yields an AGM revision function.
Lemma 1. Let κ be an OCF and let κ ⊗ S be given by Deﬁnition 4. Then κ ⊗ S deﬁnes a faithful ranking.
The next lemma shows that the deﬁnition satisﬁes the basic parallel revision postulate.
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As well, worlds that satisfy exactly the same elements of a set S retain their relative ranking before and after revision.
Lemma 3. Let κ be an OCF, let κ ⊗ S be given by Deﬁnition 4, and let S|w1 = S|w2 . Then (κ ⊗ S)(w1) − (κ ⊗ S)(w2) = κ(w1) −
κ(w2).
We obtain the following result.
Theorem 5. Parallel OCF revision satisﬁes the extended AGM postulates, (P⊗), (Ret⊗), (PC3⊗), and (PC4⊗).
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we have developed an account of parallel belief revision, in which the second argument to a revision function
is a ﬁnite set of formulas. Each formula of the set represents an individual item of information. Thus K ∗ {α,β} speciﬁes a
revision of K by two formulas, while K ∗ {α ∧β} speciﬁes a revision of K by a single formula that happens to be expressed
as a conjunction. The intention is that, following revision by a set of formulas, if a subsequent revision is in conﬂict with
some members of the original set, then belief in the other elements of that set is retained. Thus, in revising by {α,β}
and then by {¬β}, then, if α and β are independent, α continues to be believed in the resulting belief state. This is not
necessarily the case in revising by {α ∧ β} and then by {¬β}. Informally, a revision K ∗ {α,β} can be seen as yielding not
just the (contingent) incorporation of α and β among the beliefs of K, but also incorporating a counterfactual assumption
that if one of α or β was subsequently believed to be false, then the agent would still believe the other formula to be true
(provided there is no positive logical dependence between α and β).
We presented two accounts of parallel belief revision. First, we consider a basic approach, in which minimal conditions
for revising by a set of formulas are developed. Two postulates are proposed, along with corresponding semantic conditions,
and a representation result is given. Semantically we require that in a revision by a set of formulas S , in the associated
faithful ordering on worlds, for S1 ⊂ S , at the least S \ S1 worlds we also have that S1 is true. As a consequence, problems
associated with the DP Postulate (C2) are sidestepped. Second, we develop a “preferred” account of iterated parallel revision,
consisting of an additional three new postulates. This is carried out by extending the approach of Jin and Thielscher [21]
for iterated revision to deal with sets of formulas. Again, corresponding semantic conditions are given and a representation
result derived. Last, Section 5 provides a concrete construction of a parallel revision operator.
Our account of parallel revision is intended as an extension of the AGM approach. In particular, revising by an inconsis-
tent set of formulas yields an inconsistent belief set. For future work, an obvious and interesting extension is to examine
revision in the case of an inconsistent set of formulas. As the examples at the end of Section 3 indicate, there is information
that may be gleaned in revising by an inconsistent set of formulas, provided some of the elements of the set are consistent.
Thus, given some “reasonable” means of extracting consistent information from a set S , say (S), one could express revision
as follows:
Bel(K ⊗ S) = Bel(K ⊗ (S)).
Hence in this case, if β were consistent, one would expect that Bel(K ⊗ {α,¬α,β}) would also be consistent and entail β ,
while Bel(K ⊗ {α ∧ ¬α ∧ β}) would of course be inconsistent. In this way, one might obtain consistent revisions in some
cases where the input is inconsistent.
Last, as indicated in the examples in the basic approach, parallel revision may be used to encode preferences over
formulas with respect to revision. A second, intriguing direction for future research is to further explore this phenomenon,
to determine to what extent the present approach may be used to express a general notion of preference over formulas in
revision.
Appendix A. Proofs of Theorems
Notation. For W ⊆ ΘP , form(W) is a formula such that W =Mod(form(W)). Since we assume a ﬁnite underlying language,
such a formula is guaranteed to exist. Most often we will have |W| = 2, and to avoid an overabundance of brackets we will
abuse notation and write e.g. K ⊗ {form({w1,w2})} as K ⊗ form(w1,w2).
In analogy to Bel(K) standing for the set of sentences comprising the belief set of K (and to simplify notation), Mod(K)
will be the set of models of the belief set of K. I.e. Mod(K) is deﬁned as Mod(Bel(K)).
Proof of Proposition 1. Assume that S1 ⊂ S and that S1 ∪ (S \ S1) is consistent.
1. (a) (PP⊗) implies (P⊗):
From the success postulate we have that S1 ⊆ Bel(K ⊗ (S1 ∪ (S \ S1))). (PP⊗) asserts that Bel(K ⊗ S ⊗ (S \ S1)) =
Bel(K ⊗ (S1 ∪ (S \ S1))), and so S1 ⊆ Bel(K ⊗ S ⊗ (S \ S1)).
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(PP⊗) states that Bel(K ⊗ (S1 ∪ (S \ S1))) = Bel(K ⊗ S ⊗ (S \ S1)). Since S1 ⊆ Bel(K ⊗ (S1 ∪ (S \ S1))) so also S1 ⊆
Bel(K ⊗ S ⊗ (S \ S1)). Via (K ⊗ 3) and (K ⊗ 4) we obtain that Bel(K ⊗ S ⊗ (S \ S1)) = Bel(K ⊗ S ⊗ (S \ S1)) ∪ S1 =
Bel(K ⊗ S ⊗ (S1 ∪ (S \ S1))) from which we get Bel(K ⊗ (S1 ∪ (S \ S1))) = Bel(K ⊗ S ⊗ (S1 ∪ (S \ S1))).
2. (P⊗) and (S⊗) imply (PP⊗):
From (K ⊗ 3), (K ⊗ 4), and (P⊗), we get that Bel(K ⊗ S ⊗ (S \ S1)) = Bel(K ⊗ S ⊗ (S1 ∪ (S \ S1))). From (S⊗) we have in
turn that Bel(K ⊗ S ⊗ (S1 ∪ (S \ S1))) = Bel(K ⊗ (S1 ∪ (S \ S1))), from which we obtain (PP⊗). 
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof is very similar to that of Proposition 1. Assume that S1 ⊂ S and that S1 ∪ (S \ S1) is
consistent.
1. (a) (PP⊗R) implies (P⊗R):
We have that min(Mod(S1 ∪ (S \ S1)),K) ⊆ Mod(S1). (PP⊗R) then implies that min(Mod(S \ S1),K⊗S) ⊆
Mod(S1).
1.1. (PP⊗R) implies (S⊗R):
(PP⊗R) states that min(Mod(S1 ∪ (S \ S1)),K) = min(Mod(S \ S1),K⊗S). Since min(Mod(S1 ∪ (S \ S1)),K) ⊆
Mod(S1), so min(Mod(S \ S1),K⊗S) ⊆ Mod(S1). Consequently, we obtain that min(Mod(S \ S1),K⊗S) =
min(Mod(S1 ∪ (S \ S1)),K⊗S) from which we get min(Mod(S1 ∪ (S \ S1)),K) =min(Mod(S1 ∪ (S \ S1)),K⊗S).
2. (P⊗R) and (S⊗R) imply (PP⊗R):
From (P⊗R), we can show that min(Mod(S \ S1),K⊗S) =min(Mod(S1 ∪ (S \ S1)),K⊗S).
From (S⊗R) we have min(Mod(S1 ∪ (S \ S1)),K⊗S) =min(Mod(S1 ∪ (S \ S1)),K), from which we obtain (PP⊗R). 
Proof of Proposition 3. Let K be a belief state and let K be the faithful ranking induced by the faithful assignment
induced by K. Let K⊗S satisfy (P⊗R) and (S⊗R). Then K⊗S satisﬁes (PP⊗R) by the preceding result.
1. Let S1 ⊂ S where S1 ∪ (S \ S1) is consistent.
Let w ∈min(Mod(S \ S1),K⊗S). By (PP⊗R),w ∈min(Mod(S1 ∪ (S \ S1)),K), whence w ∈Mod(S1), and so w | S1.
Since w ∈ min(Mod(S \ S1),K⊗S) and w | S1, and since K⊗S is a faithful ranking, it follows that w ∈
min(Mod(S1 ∪ (S \ S1)),K⊗S).
Conversely, assume w /∈ min(Mod(S \ S1),K⊗S). If w | S \ S1 or w | S1, then trivially w /∈ min(Mod(S1 ∪ (S \ S1)),
K⊗S). So assume that w | S \ S1 and w | S1.
Towards a contradiction assume that w ∈ min(Mod(S1 ∪ (S \ S1)),K⊗S). Then since w /∈ min(Mod(S \ S1),K⊗S), for
any w ′ ∈min(Mod(S \ S1),K⊗S) we have w ′ ≺K⊗S w .
However, (PP⊗R) implies that w ′ | S1, and this together with w ′ ≺K⊗S w contradicts w ∈ min(Mod(S1 ∪ (S \ S1)),
K⊗S).
Hence w /∈min(Mod(S1 ∪ (S \ S1)),K⊗S), which was to be shown.
2. Assume S2 ⊂ S1 ⊂ S and S2  S1.
Let w1 ∈min(Mod(S \ S1),K⊗S) and w2 ∈min(Mod(S \ S2),K⊗S). (1)
Since S2 ⊂ S1 we have that (S \ S1) ⊂ (S \ S2), and so (S \ S1) ⊂ (S \ S2). From this together with (1), and since K⊗S
is a faithful ranking, it follows that w1 K⊗S w2.
Since w1 ∈min(Mod(S \ S1),K⊗S), we obtain via (PP⊗R) that w1 ∈min(Mod(S1 ∪ (S \ S1)),K), and so w1 | S1.
By the same argument with respect to w2 and S2 we get that w2 | S2.
Consider φ ∈ (S1 \ S2). We have that w2 | ¬φ since w2 | S \ S2 and φ ∈ S \ S2.
As well, φ ∈ S1.
From Part 1 of the proposition, we showed that min(Mod(S \ S1),K⊗S) =min(Mod(S1 ∪ (S \ S1)),K⊗S).
Thus, since w2 | ¬φ and φ ∈ S1, so w2 /∈min(Mod(S1 ∪ (S \ S1)),K⊗S), and so w2 /∈min(Mod(S \ S1),K⊗S).
We have already shown that w1 K⊗S w2. However, since w1 ∈ min(Mod(S \ S1),K⊗S), w2 | S \ S1, and w2 /∈
min(Mod(S \ S1),K⊗S), it follows that w1 ≺K⊗S w2. 
Proof of Theorem 2. It is more compact to show each direction for the two conditions, rather than showing both directions
for each postulate.
Construction to Postulates: Let  be a faithful ranking induced by an underlying epistemic state, and deﬁne ⊗ according
to (2), i.e.
Bel(K ⊗ S) = T (min(Mod(S),K)).
Katsuno and Mendelzon [22] show that ⊗ satisﬁes (K ⊗ 1)–(K ⊗ 8).
1. Let  satisfy (P⊗R). To show that ⊗ satisﬁes P⊗ , let S1 ⊂ S where S1 ∪ (S \ S1)  ⊥. Thus Mod(S1 ∪ (S \ S1))
= ∅, and so Mod(S \ S1) = ∅.
Let w1 ∈min(Mod(S \ S1),K⊗S).
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This means that for any w ∈min(Mod(S \ S1),K⊗S) that w | S1.
Hence min(Mod(S \ S1),K⊗S) ⊆Mod(S1) or S1 ⊆ Bel(K ⊗ S ⊗ (S \ S1)) via (2), which was to be shown.
2. Let  satisfy (S⊗R). If S1 ∪ (S \ S1)  ⊥ then S⊗ is trivially satisﬁed.
So assume that S1 ∪ (S \ S1)  ⊥, and let w ∈Mod(K ⊗ (S1 ∪ (S \ S1))).
Thus in the associated faithful ranking we have w ∈min(Mod(S1 ∪ (S \ S1)),K).
Via (S⊗R) this means that w ∈min(Mod(S1 ∪ (S \ S1)),K⊗S).
But then in terms of our deﬁned revision operator this means that w ∈Mod(K ⊗ S ⊗ (S1 ∪ (S \ S1))).
Consequently, we have that Mod(K ⊗ (S1 ∪ (S \ S1))) ⊆Mod(K ⊗ S ⊗ (S1 ∪ (S \ S1))).
The reverse containment follows by noting that each step above is in fact an if-and-only-if.
We obtain that
Mod
(K ⊗ (S1 ∪ (S \ S1)))=Mod(K ⊗ S ⊗ (S1 ∪ (S \ S1))),
whence
Bel
(K ⊗ (S1 ∪ (S \ S1)))= Bel(K ⊗ S ⊗ (S1 ∪ (S \ S1))).
Postulates to Construction: Deﬁne, for every w1,w2 ∈ ΘP , w1 K w2 iff w1 ∈Mod(K ⊗ form(w1,w2)). We have from [22]
that K (and so of course K⊗S ) is a total preorder that captures one-shot AGM revision.
1. We need to show that, given this deﬁnition and Postulate (P⊗) that condition (P⊗R) holds.
Let S1 ⊂ S where S1 ∪ (S \ S1)  ⊥. Let w ∈min(Mod(S \ S1),K⊗S).
Since K⊗S is a faithful ranking, this means that w ∈Mod(K ⊗ S ⊗ (S \ S1)).
By (P⊗) we obtain that w | S1, from which it follows that min(Mod(S \ S1),K⊗S) ⊆Mod(S1).
2. We need to show that, given the initial deﬁnition and Postulate (S⊗) that condition (S⊗R) holds.
Let S1 ⊂ S . If S1 ∪ (S \ S1)  ⊥, then (S⊗R) holds trivially.
So assume that S1 ∪ (S \ S1)  ⊥, and let w ∈min(Mod(S1 ∪ (S \ S1)),K).
Thus w ∈Mod(K ⊗ (S1 ∪ (S \ S1))).
Therefore by (S⊗) we obtain that w ∈Mod(K ⊗ S ⊗ (S1 ∪ (S \ S1))).
Consequently w ∈min(Mod(S1 ∪ (S \ S1)),K⊗S).
This shows that min(Mod(S1 ∪ (S \ S1)),K) ⊆min(Mod(S1 ∪ (S \ S1)),K⊗S).
The reverse containment, viz.
min
(
Mod
(
S1 ∪ (S \ S1)
)
,K⊗S
)⊆min(Mod(S1 ∪ (S \ S1)),K)
follows by observing that each step above is in fact an if-and-only-if. 
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof is by induction on |S \ S1|.
If |S \ S1| = 1 then for S \ S1 = {φ} we are to show that S1 ⊆ Bel(K ⊗ S ⊗ {¬φ}). But this is just an instance of (P⊗).
If |S \ S1| = 2 then the result follows from the factoring result in AGM revision. That is, let S \ S1 = {φ,ψ}. Then the
AGM factoring result yields
Bel
(K ⊗ S ⊗ {¬φ ∨¬ψ})=
{Bel(K ⊗ S ⊗ {¬φ}) or
Bel(K ⊗ S ⊗ {¬ψ}) or
Bel(K ⊗ S ⊗ {¬φ}) ∩ Bel(K ⊗ S ⊗ {¬ψ}).
We have already noted that S \ {φ} ⊆ Bel(K ⊗ S ⊗ {¬φ}), from which it trivially follows that S \ {φ,ψ} ⊆ Bel(K ⊗ S ⊗ {¬φ}),
and analogously S \ {φ,ψ} ⊆ Bel(K ⊗ S ⊗ {¬ψ}). It follows also that S \ {φ,ψ} ⊆ Bel(K ⊗ S ⊗ {¬φ}) ∩ Bel(K ⊗ S ⊗ {¬ψ}),
from which our result follows using the factoring result.
The general case with |S \ S1| > 2 follows by a straightforward induction, again using the AGM factoring result. We omit
the details. 
Lemma 4. Let S, S ′ be two sets of sentences and w1,w2 two possible worlds, such that Mod(S ′) = {w1,w2} and S|w2 ⊆ S|w1 . Then
for all A ⊆ S such that A ∪ S ′ is consistent, we have w1 | A.
Proof. Suppose there exists A ⊆ S such that, A ∪ S ′ is consistent and w1 | A. Since Mod(S ′) = {w1,w2}, it follows that
w2 | A. From S|w2 ⊆ S|w1, we have A ⊇ S|w1. This contradicts w1 | A. 
Proof of Theorem 3.
(⇒) Assume S|w2 ⊂ S|w1, w1 K w2 and w2 K⊗S w1. Let S ′ be a set of sentences such that, Mod(S ′) = {w1,w2}. Let
α ∈ S be a sentence such that, w1 | α and w2 | α. From Lemma 4, it follows that ∀Sc ∈ S||S ′ that w1 | Sc . Thus
w1 | Sc ∪ S ′ . From w1 K w2, it follows that w1 | Bel(K ⊗ (Sc ∪ S ′)). Therefore, Bel(K ⊗ (Sc ∪ S ′))  ¬α. Then (Ret⊗)
implies that Bel((K ⊗ S) ⊗ S ′)  α, which contradicts w2 K⊗S w1.
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world such that w2 | Bel((K⊗ S1)⊗ S2) and w2 | α. Let Sc = S1|w2. Obviously, Sc ∈ S1||S2. Thus Bel(K⊗ (Sc ∪ S2)) 
¬α. Let w1 be a possible world such that w1 | Bel(K⊗ (Sc ∪ S2)) and w1 | α. It follows immediately that w1 K w2.
Since w1 | Sc,w1 | α and w2 | α, we have S1|w2 ⊂ S1|w1. Thus (Ret⊗R) implies w1 ≺K⊗S1 w2. This contradicts
w2 | Bel((K ⊗ S1) ⊗ S2). 
Proof of Proposition 5. It suﬃces to show that (Ret⊗R) implies (Ind⊗R). Assume w1 = S , w2 | S and w1 K w2. Obviously,
S|w2 ⊂ S|w1. From (Ret⊗R), it follows that w1 ≺K⊗S w2. 
Proof of Theorem 4.
1. (⇒) Assume S|w2 ⊆ S|w1, w1 ≺K w2 and w2 K⊗S w1. Let S ′ be a set of sentences such that Mod(S ′) = {w1,w2}.
From Lemma 4, it follows that ∀Sc ∈ S||S ′ we have w1 | Sc . Thus Mod(K ⊗ (Sc ∪ S ′)) = {w1}, since w1 ≺K w2.
Let α be a sentence such that w1 | α and w2 | α. It follows that ∀Sc ∈ S||S ′ we have Bel(K ⊗ (Sc ∪ S ′))  α.
Then (PC3⊗) implies that Bel((K ⊗ S) ⊗ S ′)  α. This contradicts w2 K⊗S w1 and w2 | α.
(⇐) Assume ∀Sc ∈ S1||S2 we have Bel(K ⊗ (Sc ∪ S2))  α, and Bel((K ⊗ S1)⊗ S2)  α. Let w2 be a possible world such
that w2 | Bel((K ⊗ S1)⊗ S2) and w2 | α. Let Sc = S1|w2. Obviously, Sc ∈ S1||S2. Thus Bel(K ⊗ (Sc ∪ S2))  α. Let
w1 be a possible world such that w1 | Bel(K ⊗ (Sc ∪ S2)). It is easy to see that w1 ≺K w2 and Sc |w2 ⊆ Sc |w1.
Then (PC3⊗R) implies w1 ≺K⊗S1 w2. This contradicts w2 | Bel((K ⊗ S1) ⊗ S2).
2. (⇒) Assume S|w2 ⊆ S|w1, w1 K w2 and w2 ≺K⊗S w1. Let S ′ be a set of sentences such that Mod(S ′) = {w1,w2}.
From Lemma 4, it follows that ∀Sc ∈ S||S ′ we have that w1 | Sc . Thus w1 | Bel(K ⊗ (Sc ∪ S ′)), since w1 K w2.
Let α be a sentence such that w1 | α and w2 | α. It follows that Bel(K ⊗ (Sc ∪ S ′))  ¬α. Then (PC4⊗) implies
that Bel((K ⊗ S) ⊗ S ′)  ¬α. This contradicts w2 ≺K⊗S w1 and w2 | α.
(⇐) Assume ∀Sc ∈ S1||S2 we have that Bel(K ⊗ (Sc ∪ S2))  ¬α, and Bel((K ⊗ S1) ⊗ S2)  ¬α. Let w2 be a possible
world such that w2 | Bel((K ⊗ S1) ⊗ S2). Let Sc = S1|w2. Obviously, Sc ∈ S1||S2. Thus Bel(K ⊗ (Sc ∪ S2))  ¬α.
Let w1 be a possible world such that w1 | Bel(K ⊗ (Sc ∪ S2)) and w1 | α. It is easy to see that w1 K w2
and S1|w2 ⊆ S1|w1. Then (PC4⊗R) implies that w1 K⊗S1 w2. Thus w1 | Bel((K ⊗ S1) ⊗ S2), which contradicts
Bel((K ⊗ S1) ⊗ S2)  ¬α. 
Proof of Proposition 7. Assume S|w2 = S|w1. Suppose w1 K w2. Then (PC4⊗R) implies w1 K⊗S w2. Suppose
w1 K⊗S w2. It follows from (PC3⊗R) that w2 ⊀K w1. Thus w1 K w2, since K is total. 
Proof of Proposition 9. It suﬃces to show that (Ret⊗R), (PC3⊗R) and (PC4⊗R) imply (PP⊗R′). Let S1 ⊂ S where S1 is
consistent with Bel(K ⊗ (S \ S1)). Thus there is a possible world w such that w ∈ min(Mod(S \ S1),K) and w | S1. We
need to show that min(Mod(S1 ∪ (S \ S1)),K) =min(Mod(S \ S1),K⊗S).
⊆ Suppose there is a possible world w1 such that w1 ∈ min(Mod(S1 ∪ (S \ S1)),K) and w1 /∈ min(Mod(S \ S1),K⊗S).
This implies that there exists another possible world w2 ∈ min(Mod(S \ S1),K⊗S) and w2 ≺K⊗S w1. Since w2 ∈
Mod(S \ S1) and w ∈ min(Mod(S \ S1),K), we have w K w2. As w | S1 ∪ (S \ S1) and w2 | (S \ S1), it is obvious
that S|w2 ⊆ S|w . It follows from (PC4⊗R) that w K⊗S w2. On the other hand, since w1 ∈min(Mod(S1 ∪ (S \ S1)),K)
and w ∈ Mod(S1 ∪ (S \ S1)) we have w1 K w . It follows from (PC4⊗R) that w1 K⊗S w as S|w1 = S|w . This contra-
dicts w K⊗S w2 and w2 ≺K⊗S w1.
⊇ Suppose there is a possible world w1 such that w1 ∈ min(Mod(S \ S1),K⊗S) and w1 /∈ min(Mod(S1 ∪ (S \ S1)),K).
Since w ∈ min(Mod(S \ S1),K) and w1 ∈ Mod(S \ S1), we have w K w2. Now we show that w1 | S1. Sup-
pose w1 | S1. Since w | S1, we have S|w1 ⊂ S|w . It follows from (Ret⊗R), w ≺K⊗S w1. This contradicts w1 ∈
min(Mod(S \ S1),K⊗S). Thus we have w1 | S1. It implies that there exists another possible world w2 such that
w2 ∈min(Mod(S1 ∪ (S \ S1)),K) and w2 ≺K w1. Since S|w1 = S|w2, it follows from (PC3⊗R) that w2 ≺K⊗S w1. This
contradicts w1 ∈min(Mod(S \ S1),K⊗S). 
Proof of Lemma 1. It is straightforward to verify that κ ⊗ S is a total function on ΘP . Thus κ ⊗ S deﬁnes a total preorder
over ΘP .
If w ∈ min(S, κ) then, by the ﬁrst condition in Deﬁnition 4, (κ ⊗ S)(w) = 0. Similarly, if w /∈ min(S, κ), then it can be
seen that (κ ⊗ S)(w) = 0, as follows.
If w /∈min(S, κ) and w | S then (κ ⊗ S)(w) = 0 by Condition 3 in Deﬁnition 4.
If w ∈min(Cs(S1), κ) for some S1 ⊂ S , then it can be observed from Condition 2 in Deﬁnition 4 that (κ ⊗ S)(w) 1.
If w /∈ min(Cs(S1), κ) for any S1 ⊂ S then, since (κ ⊗ S)(S1)  1, it can be observed from Condition 3 in Deﬁnition 4
that (κ ⊗ S)(w) 1.
Hence κ ⊗ S satisﬁes the conditions for a faithful ranking. 
Proof of Lemma 2. Since by Lemma 1, κ ⊗ S deﬁnes a faithful ranking, the lemma holds for S1 = S . For the induction
hypothesis, assume that the claim holds for all sets S1 ⊆ S where |S| − |S1| < j for some j  0.
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in Deﬁnition 4, since (κ ⊗ S)(Cs(S2)) can be seen to be greater than (κ ⊗ S)(Cs(S ′1)) for any S ′1 where |S ′1| + 1= |S2|. 
Proof of Lemma 3. Let S ′ = Cs(S|w2) (= Cs(S|w1)). There are four cases:
1. If w1,w2 ∈min(S ′, κ), then κ(w1) = κ(w2), and Condition 2 in Deﬁnition 4 implies that (κ ⊗ S)(w1) = (κ ⊗ S)(w2).
2. If w1 ∈min(S ′, κ), w2 /∈min(S ′, κ) then substituting into the equation in Condition 3 of Deﬁnition 4 we get:
(κ ⊗ S)(w2) = (κ ⊗ S)
(
Cs(S|w2)
)+ κ(w2) − κ(Cs(S|w2))
or
(κ ⊗ S)(w2) = (κ ⊗ S)(w1) + κ(w2) − κ(w1).
Rearranging terms we get:
(κ ⊗ S)(w2) − (κ ⊗ S)(w1) = κ(w2) − κ(w1).
3. The same argument establishes the result for w1 /∈min(S ′, κ), w2 ∈min(S ′, κ).
4. If w1 /∈min(S ′, κ), w2 /∈min(S ′, κ) then two instances of Condition 3 of Deﬁnition 4 give
(κ ⊗ S)(w1) = (κ ⊗ S)
(
S ′
)+ κ(w1) − κ(S ′), (6)
(κ ⊗ S)(w2) = (κ ⊗ S)
(
S ′
)+ κ(w2) − κ(S ′). (7)
Subtracting (7) from (6) yields:
(κ ⊗ S)(w1) − (κ ⊗ S)(w2) = κ(w1) − κ(w2). 
Proof of Theorem 5. It suﬃces to show that κ ⊗ S is a faithful ranking that satisﬁes the semantic conditions (P⊗R), (Ret⊗R),
(PC3⊗R), and (PC4⊗R).
• From Lemma 1 we have that κ ⊗ S deﬁnes a faithful ranking. By the representation theorem of [22] (extended to sets),
κ ⊗ S satisﬁes the extended AGM postulates.
• For (P⊗R), assume that S ′ ⊂ S where S ′ ∪ (S \ S ′)  ⊥, and let w ∈min((S \ S ′), κ ⊗ S).
Assume toward a contradiction that w /∈ Mod(S ′). So we have for some S ′′ ⊂ S ′ that w | S ′′ and w | S \ S ′′ . Since
w ∈ min((S \ S ′), κ ⊗ S), (S \ S ′) ⊂ (S \ S ′′), and w | S \ S ′′ , this means that w ∈ min((S \ S ′′), κ ⊗ S). Since w | S ′′
this also means that w ∈ min(S ′′ ∪ (S \ S ′′), κ ⊗ S) or w ∈ min(Cs(S ′′), κ ⊗ S). We also have by assumption that w ∈
min((S \ S ′), κ ⊗ S), and so (κ ⊗ S)(w) (κ ⊗ S)(Cs(S ′)).
But this in turn implies that (κ ⊗ S)(Cs(S ′′)) (κ ⊗ S)(Cs(S ′)) where S ′′ ⊂ S ′ , contradicting Lemma 2. Consequently we
must have that w ∈Mod(S ′).
• For [(PC3⊗R)] and [(PC4⊗R)], consider where S|w2 = S|w1; the case S|w2 ⊂ S|w1 is implied by (Ret⊗R), covered in
the next item.
Lemma 3 states that (κ ⊗ S)(w1)− (κ ⊗ S)(w2) = κ(w1)−κ(w2), which immediately implies [(PC3⊗R)] and [(PC4⊗R)].
• For (Ret⊗R), assume that S|w2 ⊂ S|w1 and that κ(w1) κ(w2); we must show that (κ ⊗ S)(w1) < (κ ⊗ S)(w2).
Let S1 = S|w1 and S2 = S|w2.
If we can show that the result holds for |S2| + 1 = |S1| then by transitivity of  the result holds trivially for |S2| +
i = |S1| for i  1. So assume further that |S2| + 1= |S1|.
There are three cases:
1. w1 ∈min(Cs(S1), κ) and w2 ∈min(Cs(S2), κ).
From Condition 2 of Deﬁnition 4 we obtain that
(κ ⊗ S)(w2) =max
{
(κ ⊗ S)(Cs(S ′1)), (κ ⊗ S)(Cs(S ′1))+ κ(Cs(S2))− κ(Cs(S ′1)) ∣∣ S ′1 ⊆ S
and
∣∣S ′1∣∣+ 1= |S2|}+ 1
max
{
(κ ⊗ S)(Cs(S1)), (κ ⊗ S)(Cs(S1))+ κ(Cs(S2))− κ(Cs(S1))}+ 1
=max{(κ ⊗ S)(w1), (κ ⊗ S)(w1) + κ(w2) − κ(w1)}+ 1
= (κ ⊗ S)(w1) + κ(w2) − κ(w1) + 1.
The last step comes from the fact that κ(w1) κ(w2) by assumption. Hence
(κ ⊗ S)(w2) − (κ ⊗ S)(w1) κ(w2) − κ(w1) + 1 > κ(w2) − κ(w1),
which establishes the result.
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Let w ′1 ∈ min(Cs(S1), κ). Since S|w1 = S|w ′1, Lemma 3 implies that (κ ⊗ S)(w1) − (κ ⊗ S)(w ′1) = κ(w1) − κ(w ′1)
where in addition we have κ(w1) − κ(w ′1) > 0.
Rearranging terms we get
(κ ⊗ S)(w ′1)− κ(w ′1)= (κ ⊗ S)(w1) − κ(w1). (8)
From the previous case, above, we have that
(κ ⊗ S)(w2) − (κ ⊗ S)
(
w ′1
)
> κ(w2) − κ
(
w ′1
)
or
(κ ⊗ S)(w2) > (κ ⊗ S)
(
w ′1
)+ κ(w2) − κ(w ′1).
Substituting (8) into this inequality yields
(κ ⊗ S)(w2) > (κ ⊗ S)(w1) + κ(w2) − κ(w1)
or
(κ ⊗ S)(w2) − (κ ⊗ S)(w1) > κ(w2) − κ(w1)
which establishes the result.
3. w2 /∈min(Cs(S2), κ).
Let w ′1 ∈min(Cs(S1), κ) and w ′2 ∈min(Cs(S2), κ).
From Lemma 3 we have that
(κ ⊗ S)(w ′1)− (κ ⊗ S)(w1) = κ(w ′1)− κ(w1),
(κ ⊗ S)(w ′2)− (κ ⊗ S)(w2) = κ(w ′2)− κ(w2).
Rearranging terms yields:
(κ ⊗ S)(w ′1)− κ(w ′1)= (κ ⊗ S)(w1) − κ(w1), (9)
(κ ⊗ S)(w ′2)− κ(w ′2)= (κ ⊗ S)(w2) − κ(w2). (10)
From the ﬁrst case, above, we have:
(κ ⊗ S)(w ′2)− (κ ⊗ S)(w ′1)> κ(w ′2)− κ(w ′1)
or
(κ ⊗ S)(w ′2)− κ(w ′2)> (κ ⊗ S)(w ′1)− κ(w ′1).
Substituting (9) and (10) into the above gives
(κ ⊗ S)(w2) − κ(w2) > (κ ⊗ S)(w1) − κ(w1)
and rearranging terms gives
(κ ⊗ S)(w2) − (κ ⊗ S)(w1) > κ(w2) − κ(w1),
which establishes the result. 
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